FT：鲜为人知的中组部（The party organizer）

About a kilometre west of Tiananmen Square and the compound housing China's top leaders in central Beijing stands a large unmarked building. No sign hangs at the entrance to indicate the business conducted inside. The occupant's phone number is unlisted; calls from the building do not display an incoming number identifying their origin, just a string of zeros.	在北京天安门广场及中国最高领导人住宅区以西大约一公里，坐落着一幢没有标志的大楼。入口处没有招牌显示楼内办理何种事务。大楼使用者的电话号码没有列入电话簿。从楼里打出的电话不显示来电号码，只有一连串的零。
As the Communist party on Thursday marks 60 years in power, however, the occupants of the office complex will be quietly celebrating as well. Little known even within China, the body based there and known as Zhongzubu – the Central Organisation Department – has emerged from the country's economic upheaval of the past three decades as indispensable to the party's hold on power.	不过，在今年纪念中国共产党执政60周年之际，这里的工作人员也在悄悄庆祝。这个组织即便在中国国内也鲜为人知，它被称为中组部，即中共中央组织部。经过30年动荡的经济转型，它已成为共产党执政必不可少的组织。
China's embrace of the market since the late 1970s has driven a surge in economic growth and a social revolution. Chinese citizens are in many respects freer and richer than they ever have been under communism, able to work where they want, travel overseas and buy homes and cars. But while easing controls over aspects of the economy and society, the party has worked to ensure it maintains its grip on other levers of power.	上世纪70年代末以来，中国拥抱市场，推动了高速经济发展和一场社会革命。中国公民在很多方面都比在共产主义制度下的任何时候更为自由，也更为富裕。他们可以在自己喜欢的地方工作，出国旅游，购置房产和轿车。然而，在经济和社会的某些层面放松管制的同时，党下了一番功夫，确保自己紧紧抓住它权力的杠杆。
The party still directly controls the armed forces and the media. The Central Organisation Department is its third and least-known pillar of power and the key to its hold over personnel throughout every level of government and industry. Far from undermining the department's position, the freedoms unleashed by the market economy have made personnel control more essential than ever in fending off rivals for power. The ability to vet government staff for their loyalty to the leadership, senior officials believe, is also essential to the party's grip on power into the future.	党仍然直接控制着军队和媒体。中组部是其第三大、也是最鲜为人知的权力支柱，掌握着各级政府和行业的人事大权。市场经济所释放的自由，非但没有削弱该部门的地位，反而令人事控制在权力角逐中变得空前重要。高层官员相信，有能力审查政府官员对领导层的忠诚度，对于党在未来持续掌握执政权是至关重要的。
The department has been headed since late 2007 by Li Yuanchao, one of the more open-minded figures of the new generation of Chinese leaders. Mr Li studied briefly at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has been at the forefront of moves to cultivate ideas to modernise the party. His day-to-day duties at the department, however, are decidedly old-fashioned.	自2007年年末以来，中组部部长一直由李源潮担任。在新一代中国领导人中，他的思想相对开放。李源潮曾在哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院(Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University)短期进修，在解放思想、推进党的现代化建设方面，他站在了最前沿。不过，他在组织部的日常职责还绝对是老一套。
The department replicates what was known in the Soviet Union as the nomenklatura, the “list of names” of party members who formed the Communist ruling class through their eligibility to fill prized jobs in any sectors the state controlled. “The system is all from the Soviet Union but the CCP has taken it to an extreme,” says Yuan Weishi, of Sun Yat-sen University in Guangdong. “China is more radical. [The party here] wants to lead everything.”	中组部复制了前苏联所称的“权贵阶层”(nomenklatura)，即一份组成共产党统治阶层的党员“名单”，名单上的人有资格在政府控制的各个领域担任要职。“制度完全从苏联照搬过来，但中共将其发挥到了极致，”广州中山大学的袁伟时表示。“中国做得更为彻底。（党）想要领导一切。”
To glean a sense of the dimensions of the organisation department's job, conjure up a parallel body in Washington. The imaginary department would oversee the appointments of US state governors and their deputies; the mayors of big cities; heads of federal regulatory agencies; the chief executives of General Electric, ExxonMobil, Walmart and 50-odd of the remaining largest companies; justices on the Supreme Court; the editors of The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post, the bosses of the television networks and cable stations, the presidents of Yale and Harvard and other big universities and the heads of think-tanks such as the Brookings Institution and the Heritage Foundation.	要想对中组部的职能范围有所认识，不妨试想在华盛顿有一个平行部门。这个假想的部门将监督以下人事任命：美国各州的州长和副州长，各大城市的市长，联邦监管机构负责人，通用电气(General Electric)、埃克森美孚(ExxonMobil)、沃尔玛(Walmart)及其它50来家最大公司的首席执行官，最高法院(Supreme Court)的法官，《纽约时报》(The New York Times)、《华尔街日报》(The Wall Street Journal) 和《华盛顿邮报》(The Washington Post)的总编辑，各电视广播公司和有线电视台的老板，耶鲁(Yale)、哈佛及其它重点大学的校长，以及布鲁金斯学会(Brookings Institution)和美国传统基金会(Heritage Foundation)等智库的领导。
All equivalent positions in China are filled by people appointed by the party through the organisation department. With a few largely symbolic exceptions, the people who fill these jobs are also party members. Not only that, the vetting process takes place behind closed doors and appointments are announced without any explanation about why they have been made. When the department knocks back candidates for promotion, it does so in secret as well.	在中国，所有的对等职位都由党通过中组部任命。除了少数几位象征性的非党人士任命，担任这些职务的人士都是党员。不仅如此，审查过程是闭门进行的；宣布任命时，中组部也不对任命的依据作任何解释。当中组部否决候选人晋升时，它同样秘而不宣。
The patronage dispensed through the department, in the form of the most powerful party and government positions in the country, has turned it into a forum for the system's toughest internal political battles. Politburo members, factional groupings, the centre and the provinces, and individuals aligned to different ministries and industries all struggle to place their people into positions of influence in state institutions.	通过该部门施予的、以最有权的党和政府职位为形式的恩惠，使其成为体制内最激烈内部政治角逐的平台。中共中央政治局成员、各派系集团、中央和省，以及附属于不同部门和产业的个人，无不竭力把自己人安排在政府机构中具有影响力的位置上。
“If the job of a bureau chief becomes vacant, then a lot of senior officials in Beijing will want to have it filled with their person. In times like this, the organisation department will have a very difficult task,” says Wu Si, the editor of Annals of the Yellow Emperor, a prominent liberal magazine. “It is meant to be about virtue and talent but it becomes a test of your relationship with the department and the seniority of your patron. At the end of the day, the department cannot be bypassed.”	“如果腾出了一个局长职位，北京的许多高层官员都会想让他们的自己人填补空缺。这种时候，中组部的任务会很艰巨，”知名的自由派杂志《炎黄春秋》(Annals of the Yellow Emperor)主编吴思表示。“选拔本应以德才为依据，但实际上它变成了考核你与该部门的关系以及你的后台的地位。归根结底，你无法绕开组织部。”
In the absence of elections or any overt competition for government posts, the behind-the-scenes battles to secure appointments are the very stuff of politics in China. As the clearing house for these disputes, the organisation department has become not only the institutional hub of the entire political system but also the battleground over reforms crucial to the party's modernisation.	在政府职位人选未经选举或公开竞争产生的情形下，确保任命的幕后角逐，就成了中国政治的精髓。作为此类争议的“清算机构”，中组部不仅成为整个政治体制的机构中枢，也已成为围绕各项改革的战场——这些改革对党的现代化建设十分关键。
It is beset by constant competing tensions. The Politburo has striven to professionalise the selection of top officials, while at the same time undermining the process by fixing appointments in favour of loyalists and relatives. Officials presiding over local fiefdoms have swept aside the rules even more crudely, establishing markets in which government positions are bought and sold for gain.	不断相互角力的紧张局面，妨碍了党的现代化进程。政治局力图实现最高官员选拔程序的专业化，但同时又作出惠及亲信和亲属的任命安排，从而破坏了专业化进程。在地方上一人独大的官员则更加明目张胆地无视规则，建立了通过买官牟利的市场。
Outwardly, the organisation department is these days very different from the body established by Mao Zedong in the 1930s. Rules for appointments are codified in more than 70 articles that read much like legislation. Promotions are tied to length of service, education levels and mandatory classes at a party school every five years.	从表面上看，今天的中组部已与上世纪30年代毛泽东建立的那个组织大相径庭。任命规则已编列成文，形成70多项条款，读起来颇似法律。晋升与工龄、教育水平和每五年必修的党校课程挂钩。
Officials holding posts such as governor or mayor are rated according to a lengthy list of numerical indicators that look like they were drawn up by management consultants. Economic growth, investment, the quality of the air and water in their localities and public order all theoretically count in the performance metric.	担任省长或市长等职的官员必须接受评级，依据是一长串看似由管理咨询师拟定的数字指标。经济增长率、投资、当地的空气和水质量以及公共秩序，理论上都是绩效评估标准。
The department has developed all the trappings of a sophisticated multinational headhunter, using psychological tests, lie detectors and confidential interviews with colleagues of officials up for promotion. For modernisers in the party, the benchmarks are essential to elevate the standard of government administration and keep corruption to a minimum.	中组部已摆出资深跨国猎头公司的全部架势——利用心理测试和测谎仪，并与考虑提拔的官员的同事作秘密面谈。在党内的现代派看来，制定考核标准对提高政府的行政水平、把腐败控制在最低限度至关重要。
But the regulations contain loopholes. Officials judged to be “exceptionally talented young cadres”, for example, can be promoted regardless of seniority. “It all depends on whether you get noticed at the end of the day,” says an adviser to the department. “There is no scientific system. Nearly everyone gets the same points in all of these elaborate assessments anyway, because for you not to do so would reflect badly on your superior.”	但这些规章存在漏洞。比如，被认为是“特别优秀的年轻干部”可以不论资历得到提拔。“最终，一切都取决于有没有人注意到你，”该部门的一名顾问表示。“不存在什么科学的制度。反正在这些复杂的评估中，几乎所有人的得分都一样，因为如果你不一样，你的上司就会难堪。”
Senior leaders have long held sway over jobs in select ministries and industrial sectors. Li Peng, the former premier, was the longtime ruler of the power sector, where two of his children rose to hold powerful jobs. Zhu Rongji, another former premier, oversaw the finance sector, allowing him to appoint the heads of large financial institutions and make his son the highly paid head of China International Capital Corporation, the country's largest investment bank.	中国高层领导人长期以来掌握着特定部门和行业的大权。前总理李鹏曾是电力行业的长期统治者，他的两个孩子在该行业一路晋升至实权职位。另一位前总理朱镕基曾负责金融业，这使他能够任命大型金融机构的主管，自己的儿子也担任了中国最大投行——中国国际金融公司(CICC)的高薪总裁。
Jiang Zemin, the former party chief, reigned over the technology sector, brushing aside professionals in the organisation department to usher loyalists into top jobs and his son into important positions within the sector in Shanghai. More recently, Politburo members in charge of the law and state security have been influential in senior energy appointments.	科技部门则由党的前总书记江泽民把持。他撇开了中组部内的专家，而将自己的亲信安排至高层，并扶植其子担任上海科技部门要职。不久前，在能源部门高层的任命上，某些主管法制和国家安全的政治局成员也发挥了相当的影响力。
The party's most effective tool in elevating competence over cronyism over the last decade has been a resolutely old-fashioned one. The department stress-tests promising officials by rotating them through jobs in diverse parts of the country and in different administrative units, before hauling them back to Beijing into the big league if they pass muster.	过去十年来，党试图超越裙带关系，转而注重能力。在这方面最有效的手段绝对是一种老式做法。中组部对有发展前途的官员作压力测试，派他们在全国不同地区、不同行政单位之间轮岗，只有在他们经受住考验后，才将他们调回北京，安排进中央权力机构。
By the time Chen Deming was tapped to be commerce minister in 2007, for example – a post that put him in charge of trade policy and negotiations and foreign investment policy – he had already served in three distinct positions.	以陈德铭为例，在2007年升任商务部长——主管贸易政策、谈判和外资政策——之前，他已经在三个截然不同的职位上任职。
In Suzhou, as mayor and party secretary, Mr Chen helped build the city in the Yangtze delta near Shanghai into one of China's most advanced manufacturing hubs, winning kudos on the ground by standing up for local interests even when it embarrassed Beijing.	在担任苏州市长、市委书记期间，陈德铭推动把这座地处长江三角洲、邻近上海的城市建设为中国最先进的制造业枢纽之一。他对地方利益的维护，使他赢得了赞誉，即使这曾令北京难堪。
After Suzhou, Mr Chen was dispatched to Shaanxi, where his reputation survived. Finally, he was put in charge of the sensitive energy portfolio in Beijing before being promoted to take charge of trade.	离开苏州后，陈德铭被调往陕西省，他的名声在那里继续得到保持。最后，他被调回北京，主管敏感的能源工作，直至晋升为商务部长，开始主管贸易。
Carlos Gutierrez, his counterpart in the administration of George W. Bush, met Mr Chen in 2007 and remarked how impressed he was by his grasp of his portfolio after a short period in the job. Mr Chen's career path, said Mr Gutierrez, reminded him of the rigours that successful multinationals put their up-and-coming executives through, sending them first out into the field to difficult regional offices and underperforming divisions before bringing them back into head office to see how they performed there.	乔治·W·布什(George W. Bush)政府的商务部长卡洛斯·古铁雷斯(Carlos Gutierrez) 2007年曾与陈德铭会面，对于陈德铭上任不久、却对自己的工作有如此之深的理解赞叹不已。古铁雷斯表示，陈德铭的职业生涯令他想起了一些成功的跨国公司让其有前途的管理人员经受的艰苦磨练——先把他们派往不同的区域分公司和表现不佳的部门，让他们深入第一线，然后才调回总部，考察他们在总部的表现。
The organisation department has been gradually lifting the secrecy that surrounds its operations. Old habits die hard, however. This year it appointed a spokesman but has yet to identify him or her. In spite of requests, the department did not grant an interview for this article.	中组部在逐渐掀开其运作的面纱。不过，改变旧习惯谈何容易。今年，它任命了一名发言人，但迄今尚未公开此人身份。尽管再三请求，但中组部还是没有答应就这篇文章接受采访。
The only way a member of the public can make contact with the department in Beijing is through its sole listed number, 12380, which has a recorded message, or a website allowing the caller to report any “organisational” problems.	公众能够与北京中组部联系的唯一方式，就是通过其唯一列出的号码12380（该号码有一段录音）或是网站，报告任何“组织”问题。
Friends of Mr Li once joked that they wanted to ask him as latest head of the department about what they considered to be the absurd level of secrecy that surrounds it. “Are we still an underground party?” exclaimed one of his longtime friends, before admitting he could talk to Mr Li about anything – except his work.	李源潮的朋友曾开玩笑说，在他们眼里，中组部的保密做法显得荒谬。他们想问一问身为中组部现任部长的李源潮。“我们还是地下党吗？”他的一个老友大声说道。随后他坦言，他可以与李源潮谈论任何事情——但工作除外。
Trade in state posts	买卖官位
When the mayor of Shenzhen, the commercial city bordering Hong Kong, was sacked in June for alleged corruption, much about the case was familiar. Xu Zongheng remains under investigation for claims he took bribes in return for approving construction projects, standard fare for graft indictments in China.	当邻近香港的商业城市深圳市市长许宗衡6月份因涉嫌腐败被罢免时，该案的很多情节人们都很熟悉。许宗衡仍在接受调查，他被指控用批准建筑项目换取贿赂，这是中国贪污控罪的标准罪名。
But another allegation against Mr Xu was more worrying for the central government's corruption fighters – that he had purchased his job as head of one of China's richest cities. Buying and selling official positions is commonplace in local governments in China but little known for posts as senior as that of mayor.	但对许宗衡的另一项指控，则令中央政府的反腐官员更为担心，那就是，许宗衡的市长职位是买来的。买卖官位在中国地方政府中非常普遍，但买卖市长这样高的职位还很少听说。深圳是中国最富裕城市之一。
In small localities, the most popular positions up for sale are those of party secretary and head of the local organisation department. Both jobs carry enormous discretionary powers and the ability to bestow patronage on individuals under them in return for cash.	在小地方，最受欢迎的待售官位是党委书记和地方组织部部长。这两个职位都拥有极大的自行决定权，能够任命下属官位，以换取钱财。
The bribery, corruption, treachery and sheer desperate self-interest that characterise the practice are detailed in frank internal documents written by the organisation department in Jilin province. The documents, obtained by the Financial Times, depict the competition for promotions as the “four running races” that subvert the department's rules.	吉林省组织部的一份内部书面文件，坦率列举了这类交易中的贿赂、腐败、欺诈和不择手段的利己特征。英国《金融时报》得到的这份文件，将升职竞争描述成“四种赛跑比赛”，破坏了组织部规章制度。
In “sprints”, officials opportunistically grab chances at the moment of leadership reshuffles to lobby superiors for promotions. In the “long-distance” races, they “suck up to leaders through all means, and make emotional investments, like providing hospitality, gifts and help to solve problems” of their bosses.	在“短跑”中，官员们投机性地抓住领导层重组的机会，游说上级官员提拔自己。在“长跑”中，他们“会通过各种手段巴结奉承领导，并且会进行人情投资，比如招待上司、送礼以及帮助上司解决问题”。
The “relay” race requires drumming up “multi-layered recommendation from relatives, friends, classmates and people from the same local area” to get close to leaders. In the “hurdles”, officials go over the heads of their immediate bosses, often using retired Communist party cadres to put pressure on the organisation department on their behalf.	“接力”赛则需要召集“来自亲戚、朋友、同学以及老乡的多层次推荐”，以接近领导。在“障碍赛”中，官员们会越过自己的顶头上司，往往利用已退休的共产党干部代表自己对组织部施压。
“The older senior officials who survived wartime were different from the younger officials who tend to think about themselves and are mainly after power, salary, status, housing and medical care,” Zhang Quanjing, head of the department for five years until 1999, has told local media. “This thinking triggers jealousy and encourages the buying of official posts to get promoted.”	1994年到1999年曾担任中组部部长的张全景告诉中国国内媒体：“经历过战争时期的老一辈高层官员与年轻一辈不同，年轻官员往往只为自己考虑，并且主要是为了追逐权力、工资、地位、住房和医疗。这种思想引发了嫉妒心理，助长了买官升职的风气。”
The market's value was shown by a case in Sichuan in 2007, when a man passing himself off as an organisation department official secured a payment of $63,000 from a local bureaucrat under the guise of finding him a government post.	2007年，四川发生的一起案件显示了这个官位市场的价值：一名男子假冒某组织部官员，打着可帮忙谋官的幌子，从当地一名官员那里骗走了6.3万美元。

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001030393